Penggerebekan kamp latihan militer Jalin, JanthoThe Jalin, Jantho militant training camp raid
Februari 2010February 2010
Pada Februari 2010, aparat keamanan menyerbu sebuah basis latihan militer kelompok teroris di Desa Jalin, Jantho, Aceh Besar. Peristiwa ini mengejutkan publik karena aktivitas terorisme sebelumnya lebih terpusat di Jawa. Jaringan tersebut dikaitkan dengan Dulmatin dan upaya membangun basis generasi baru Jemaah Islamiyah di Aceh. Masyarakat dan ulama setempat menolak terorisme, tetapi peristiwa ini menimbulkan kekhawatiran bagi proses perdamaian.
In February 2010 security forces raided a terrorist military training base in Jalin village, Jantho, Aceh Besar. The event shocked the public because terrorist activity had previously been concentrated in Java. The network was linked to Dulmatin and to efforts to build a base for a new generation of Jemaah Islamiyah in Aceh. Local communities and ulama rejected terrorism, but the episode raised concerns for the peace process.
Menurut warga sekitar, latihan militer di Jalin sudah diketahui sekitar dua bulan sebelum penyerbuan, meski banyak pihak semula tidak percaya ada sel teroris di Aceh. Sidney Jones berpendapat bahwa teroris memilih Aceh untuk membangun qaidah aminah, yakni basis yang aman, dengan memanfaatkan situasi damai dan penerapan hukum Islam. Analisis ini juga menduga jaringan tersebut mulai masuk sejak 2005 pascatsunami, merekrut warga lokal melalui kelompok ustaz.
Selama hampir dua bulan isu terorisme mendominasi media. Densus 88 menewaskan sejumlah anggota jaringan di sekitar Seulawah, Lhoknga, dan Medan, sementara Dulmatin, buronan paling dicari di Asia Tenggara, tewas di Banten. Dulmatin bersama rekan-rekannya, Jaja dan Sunata, diduga kuat mendirikan basis latihan bagi generasi baru Jemaah Islamiyah di Aceh. Sebelumnya terjadi serangan terhadap warga asing di Banda Aceh, termasuk staf Uni Eropa, pengajar bahasa Inggris di Universitas Syiah Kuala, dan seorang warga Jerman, yang lazim dikaitkan dengan “Orang Tidak Dikenal”; belakangan anggota jaringan yang ditangkap mengakui serangan tersebut.
Kekhawatiran utama warga Aceh bersifat politis: bila banyak orang Aceh terlibat, pemerintah pusat bisa kembali menggelar operasi militer. Gubernur Irwandi Yusuf bahkan mendatangi rumah sakit untuk memastikan para korban tewas bukan orang Aceh, dan menyimpulkan jaringan itu tidak didominasi orang Aceh. Seorang pengamat menilai para pemimpin “Al Qaeda Aceh” gagal memahami bahwa perjuangan Aceh selalu sama nasionalisnya dengan Islamisnya, dan bahwa retorika jihad bersama tidak berarti agenda politik bersama.
Dampaknya terasa hingga Aceh Utara: setelah peristiwa Februari 2010, seorang yang dekat dengan komunitas tidak bermazhab yang mendatangkan ustaz dari Jawa ditangkap polisi di kampungnya, dan beberapa ustaz yang mengajarkan jihad kepada santri menghilang.
According to local residents, the training at Jalin had been known for about two months before the raid, although many initially doubted that a terrorist cell existed in Aceh. Sidney Jones argued that militants chose Aceh to build a qaidah aminah, a secure base, exploiting the peace and the application of Islamic law. The analysis also suggests that the network began entering Aceh after the 2005 tsunami, recruiting locals through circles of religious teachers (ustaz).
For nearly two months terrorism dominated the media. The police counter-terror unit Densus 88 killed several network members around Seulawah, Lhoknga and Medan, while Dulmatin, South-east Asia's most wanted man, was killed in Banten. Dulmatin and his associates Jaja and Sunata are strongly suspected of setting up a training base for a new generation of Jemaah Islamiyah in Aceh. Earlier attacks on foreigners in Banda Aceh, including a European Union staff member, an English teacher at Syiah Kuala University and a German national, had commonly been attributed to ‘unknown persons’; arrested network members later admitted to them.
The Acehnese public's chief fear was political: if many Acehnese were involved, the central government might launch new military operations. Governor Irwandi Yusuf even visited the hospital to confirm that the dead were not Acehnese, concluding that the network was not dominated by locals. One observer noted that the leaders of ‘Al Qaeda Aceh’ failed to grasp that the Acehnese struggle had always been as nationalist as it was Islamist, and that a shared rhetoric of jihad does not imply a shared political agenda.
The repercussions reached North Aceh: after the February 2010 events, a man close to a non-madhhab community that had brought in ustaz from Java was arrested in his village, and several ustaz who had taught jihad to students disappeared.
Gagasan kunciKey ideas
Damai sebagai celahPeace as an opening
Stabilitas dan formalisasi syariat dibaca kelompok militan sebagai peluang membangun basis aman.Stability and formalised sharia were read by militants as a chance to build a safe base.
Penolakan lokalLocal rejection
Ulama, GAM, dan masyarakat Aceh menolak terorisme dan menjaga jarak darinya.Ulama, GAM and Acehnese society rejected terrorism and kept their distance.
Nasionalisme versus jihad globalNationalism versus global jihad
Kesamaan retorika keagamaan tidak menjamin kesamaan agenda politik.Shared religious rhetoric does not guarantee a shared political agenda.
Posisi dalam kerangkaPlace in the framework
Tokoh, lembaga, dan konsep yang paling dekat dengan entri ini, beserta sifat hubungannya.The figures, institutions and concepts closest to this entry, and how they relate to it.
Pertanyaan reflektifReflective question
Mengapa wilayah pascakonflik yang sedang damai justru dapat menarik jaringan militan transnasional?Why might a post-conflict region at peace attract transnational militant networks?
Kutip entri ini:Cite this entry: “Penggerebekan kamp latihan militer Jalin, Jantho”, Acehnologi — Gerbang Studi AcehAceh Studies Gateway, https://acehnologi.com/entri/penyerangan-kamp-jalin-jantho/